

Meeting Date: 5/21/2013

Report Type: Staff/Discussion

Report ID: 2013-00452

Title: Sacramento ACT Cease Fire Proposal

Location: Citywide

Issue: Sacramento ACT has developed and submitted a proposal to implement the Ceasefire program in a Sacramento neighborhood. The City Manager has agreed to provide this proposal to the City Council for consideration for Measure U funding as part of the City's budget hearing process.

Recommendation: For City Council Consideration.

Contact: Alicia Ross, Executive Director, (916) 447-7959, Sacramento ACT

Presenter: Alicia Ross, Executive Director, (916) 447-7959, Sacramento ACT

Department: Finance

Division: Budget Office

Dept ID: 06001411

Attachments:

Attachment 1 Cease Fire Letter

Attachment 2 Sacramento Safe Community Partnership Budget.

Attachment 3 Sacramento Ceasefire-Initial Progress Report

Attachment 4 Operation Ceasefire and the Safe Community Partnership

Attachment 5 Ceasefire Spreading Like Wildfire in California

Attachment 6 CWG Packet - Evidence



April 26, 2013

City Manager John Shirey
Sacramento City Hall
915 I Street, 5th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814

RE: Sacramento's Ceasefire Strategy

Dear Mr. Shirey,

We look forward to our meeting with you this upcoming Monday, April 29. Since our time with you will be limited, we wanted to share with you beforehand the critical issues we would like to ask you to support. These issues include the Ceasefire Strategy, homelessness, and blighted properties.

1. Ceasefire Strategy

As you prepare to consider a budget proposal for the City of Sacramento, we as leaders of Sacramento ACT urge the City to go forwards, instead of backwards regarding a common sense and integrated approach to public safety that includes not only enforcement, but a significant investment in evidence-based prevention and intervention programs to stop the rising gang violence in Sacramento.

As you know, ACT would like to see city-wide, full implementation of the Ceasefire Strategy. This Strategy has been recently re-launched in Stockton and Oakland in the last six months in efforts to curb the rising violence there. These cities, along with over ten other California cities, have chosen Ceasefire because when implemented city-wide and consistently over time, it works. Shootings are reduced by an average of 35-65%. No other approach has been demonstrated to show consistent results across multiple, diverse cities.

Ceasefire is not a major rehabilitation strategy for offenders, but a violence reduction strategy. It only works when it is being fully and consistently implemented, which means engaging large numbers of gang members in group "call-ins". The services are an essential component to give a sense of hope and opportunity for participants, but they are not a long-term jobs development strategy for this population. More does need to be done to support additional economic development initiatives for the re-entry population.

ACT was supportive of the City applying for and winning a state CalGRIP grant that provides partial funding for Ceasefire's continued implementation in the next two years. However, we are concerned that partial implementation will again only produce partial results. More funding is needed to produce the initial success of Ceasefire.

In addition, ACT has recently become concerned at the implementation approach the City appears to be taking with Ceasefire. The partnership governance structure of Ceasefire that was integral to Ceasefire's previous success in Sacramento appears to be disregarded in favor of implementation solely by the Parks and Recreation Department and the Police Department. ACT and SETA have MOUs as part of the CalGRIP grant, but are not currently being included in major decision-making for the strategy, as they were previously (neither is the district attorney's office or Kaiser Permanente, who have also been part of the previous governance structure for Ceasefire). Without the shared partnership governance structure and a commitment to implementing the strongest evidence-based Ceasefire model, ACT believes that the current CalGRIP grant will not be successful in achieving its intended outcomes of violence reduction.

If the City is proceeding with Ceasefire, ACT urges you to consider fully funding one neighborhood, re-establishing the partnership governance structure for Ceasefire, and maintaining a standard of an evidence-based implementation of the approach.

ACT congregation volunteers have pledged over 3,800 annual volunteer hours to support Ceasefire's implementation through night-walks, mentoring, "call-ins" and community outreach events. ACT and SETA in addition have pledge in-kind contributions to the City's Ceasefire efforts of \$155,000. **The remaining City contribution for a full scale Ceasefire effort in one neighborhood would be \$490,000 (see attached budget proposal).** The additional funding would be needed to provide:

- Part-time Project Management
- 2 Gang Intervention Specialists + management
- Full services for at least 45 participants (CALGRIP currently only funds services for 25 participants/year and with limited services)
- Technical assistance

Additionally, ACT would like to work with the City to find private foundation funding to conduct a robust evaluation of this second pilot effort by the leading Ceasefire researchers. **We also want to note that NO CITY FUNDING would ever go to Sacramento ACT. ACT has a strict policy not to accept any type of government funding.**

We hope you will champion this as a public safety budget priority for the next three years. The Sacramento community deserves the opportunity to give Ceasefire a chance to work, to measure its impact, and to demonstrate that our initial results in the Mack Road corridor were due to the full and effective implementation of Ceasefire.

2. Creating Housing Opportunities to Reduce Homelessness:

ACT has learned that the City is considering two potential sites for the Safe Ground effort. We urge you to support the approval of those two sites and to urge their expedited approval process so that those in need of immediate safe shelter options will not have to wait even longer.

We also want to urge you to support the renewal of the City's inclusionary housing ordinance at the current specified affordable housing levels (15%). Affordable housing is critical to reducing homelessness and saving our entire community the long-term costs of

care for those who cannot find housing options.

3. Pro-actively Addressing Targeted Blighted Neighborhoods:

ACT would like to see the City of Sacramento create a Neighborhood Stabilization Initiative modeled after the one implemented in Sacramento County by Community Development Director Laurie Moss. The most notable shift in policy would be towards a more pro-active approach to improving blighted properties instead of a solely complaint-driven one.

The County initiative has four key components:

- There is a focus on foreclosed/abandoned properties by shifting from only sealing up the properties to fixing up the properties and charging fees to the banks. In particular, the properties are sealed with bullet proof glass instead of plywood. This allows properties to look less obviously vacant and enables neighbors to see what is happening inside.
- Enforcement is more proactive. The County picked and mapped out four target areas and hired four code enforcement (temporarily, pending more funding) officers to focus intensively on that area.
- The County is working on passing new ordinances that allow for more maintaining of properties: ability to fix landscaping, painting etc.
- The establishment of neighborhood cleanup projects days. The County is also surveying neighborhoods that have a lot of dumping and hiring dumpsters to be brought into the neighborhood for one day. This allows the neighbors to bring items to the dumpster without having to schedule a pick-up or pay fees.

We look forward to addressing these issues with you. If you have any questions before Monday, please contact Alicia Ross at Alicia@sacact.org or 916-502-2320. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue.

Sincerely,

Howard Lawrence, ACT Leader

18-Apr-13

Sacramento Safe Community Partnership Proposed Annual Budget

Budget Items	Full Implementation in One Neighborhood**	Current Annual CalGRIP Funding	CITY CONTRIBUTION NEEDED	In-Kind Match	Responsible Party
Participant Services: 2 FTE caseworkers and 45 participants. Services include mentoring, mental health/substance abuse counseling, GED classes, workforce readiness training, and wages for job placement.	430,000	105,000	220,000	105,000	SETA
2 Gang Intervention Specialists including benefits and prog mgmt.	120,000	0	120,000	0	SETA
Data Analysis	35,000	35,000	0	0	Sac PD
Law Enforcement	50,000	0	0	\$50,000	Sac PD
Grant Manager	50,000	50,000	0	0	Parks and Rec
Project Coordination (.5 FTE @ \$25/hr)	30,000	0	30,000	0	SETA
Community Outreach	20,000	20,000	0	0	SETA
Coordination and Support of Night Walks and Events	50,000	0	0	50,000	Sacramento ACT
Outreach Volunteer Hours (3,800 hrs @ \$24.75/hr)*	94,000	0	0	94,000	Faith-based Community Partnership for Safe Communities
Program Technical Assistance	120,000	0	120,000	0	Partnership for Safe Communities
Services and Supplies	10,000	5,000	0	5,000	Parks and Rec
Administration	15,000	0	0	15,000	Parks and Rec
Indirect Costs	5,000	2,500	0	2,500	Parks and Rec
TOTAL	1,029,000	217,500	490,000	321,500	

No city/government funding goes to Sacramento ACT. Sacramento ACT does not accept government funding of any kind

**Full implementation based on approximate implementation for Ceasefire in 2011.

*Hourly volunteer contribution calculated according to www.independentsector.org.

Cost for an Evaluation by Anthony Braga, Ph.D., leading researcher on Ceasefire nationwide	180,000		180,000		Partnership for Safe Communities
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Sacramento Safe Community Partnership (Ceasefire): An Initial Progress Report

APRIL 2012

By Stewart Wakeling, Daniela Gilbert, Tim Dunham, and Brian Heller de Leon

The Sacramento Safe Community Partnership (SSCP) began its work in the spring of 2010. Concerned about youth violence in Sacramento, a group of energetic and thoughtful leaders from Sacramento Area Congregations Together (a faith-based organizing non-profit commonly referred to as ACT), local congregations and other faith-based community groups, the Sacramento Police Department, and the Sacramento Employment and Training Agency (SETA) began to build a local version of what is often referred to as Boston’s Ceasefire. This brief report describes the development of the SSCP, the strategy they employed, and the progress of their work from launch in the late summer of 2010 through approximately the end of 2011.

The Strategy: The SSCP decided to root their strategy in Boston’s well-known and successful Ceasefire initiative. Central to the intervention are “call-ins,” small town hall-style meetings with youth at highest risk of violence hosted by a range of partners that includes community members, young people formerly involved in violence, service providers, criminal justice agencies, a trauma nurse from the local hospital, and clergy leaders. During these meetings, this alliance of community leaders directly and respectfully shares a powerful anti-violence message with these youth.

SSCP developed three high-quality operational components to complement the call-ins, forming a robust local initiative. These components

Timeline of Key Events Leading to Launch

Introduction: The following timeline builds on several months of relationship building among clergy and other community stakeholders by ACT on issues affecting local youth.

- **January 2009:** ACT launches the Sacramento Ceasefire taskforce to build public and political support for implementing Ceasefire.
- **June 2009:** ACT and California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) present Ceasefire model to city manager and police chief, securing initial support.
- **August 2009:** SPD commits internal resources to planning and implementation of the strategy.
- **March 2010:** Taskforce secures funding for implementation, organizes itself as the Sacramento Safe Community Partnership.
- **June 2010:** Core partners hold 500-person “Community Action” at South Sacramento Christian Center, securing broad pastoral involvement, and support of elected officials.
- **July 2010:** Night walks and focused law enforcement efforts directed toward reducing the violence between two of the city’s most actively violent groups begin.
- **August 2010:** Using CPSC’s in-depth analysis of violence in south Sacramento, SSCP tailors the Ceasefire approach to local needs and resources.
- **October 2010:** SSCP convenes 300-person community event to introduce approach to working partners and residents. Street outreach workers are hired.
- **November 2010:** Call-ins with youth and young adults at highest risk of violence begin.

Figure 1

include the remarkable commitment by clergy leaders to “night walks” – described in more detail in *Figure 2* – in the neighborhoods most impacted by violence, well-designed services and supports through SETA, and a strategic enforcement effort. Key to the enforcement effort was the Sacramento Police Department’s Problem-Oriented Policing Unit, an effective and resourceful unit concerned largely, though not exclusively, with reducing street violence in some of Sacramento’s toughest neighborhoods.

The Challenge: Initially, SSCP considered going citywide with the initiative but concerns about the effect of a struggling national economy on city revenues coupled with the partners’ strong desire to ensure an ample supply of quality services and supports led them to restrict their focus. They worked closely with the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) to analyze serious violence in south Sacramento. Based on this analysis, the partners decided to focus on an ongoing conflict between the city’s two most actively violent groups. These two groups were primarily active in the “Mack Road corridor” in south Sacramento.

Sacramento’s homicide rate has decreased markedly since 2006, when it climbed to above 50 for the year. Even so, as recently as 2009, the rate of serious violence in Sacramento remained almost double the state average. The residents of the many apartment complexes along Mack Road in south Sacramento experienced this violence in an immediate and intense way. Two groups of young people in a major, ongoing conflict made this collection of neighborhoods almost certainly the most dangerous in the city. The conflict was also one of the city’s most intractable, for the

better part of two years resisting the attempts of the Sacramento Police Department and its law enforcement and community partners to stop the violence.

Night Walks and Leadership from ACT and the Faith Community

Night walks are an opportunity for community leaders and residents to establish a presence in a high-risk area, demonstrate their concern for people at high risk of violence, build positive relationships with high-risk youth, and connect these youth to resources in their community. As one local pastor says, “these are not about conversion, they’re about conversation”.

ACT leaders began night walks in Sacramento in July of 2010, which are consistently held in South Sacramento every Tuesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. Though led by clergy and faith-based leaders, night walks are also a way for lay leaders and residents to participate in a localized process of relationship building and violence intervention.

The impact and value of the night walks in Sacramento stem from their *focus on relationship building with the highest risk individuals and groups in the highest risk places, and during the times of day when the risk of violence is highest.*



While night walks are led by clergy and faith-based leaders, the night walks are not the only way faith-based leadership plays a significant role in Sacramento’s Ceasefire effort. In addition to playing a leadership role in strategy design, clergy and other faith-based leaders speak at call-ins, organize and host gatherings with highest risk youth to build relationships with them and their families, counsel high-risk youth, and hold community events including health fairs and job fairs for them.

Clergy and faith-based leaders have spent over 9,000 volunteer hours on night walks—or the equivalent of over four full time staff positions—working in a strategic and focused way on addressing the issue of local youth violence.

Progress to Date: The implementation of the strategy began in the late summer of 2010 and became fully operational with the convening of the first call-in in early November 2010. Over approximately the first year of the initiative, the SSCP convened a dozen call-ins focused on the groups involved in the city’s most actively violent conflict. Over 200 young people have been invited to the call-ins, and of those invited, over 60 percent have attended. In the first five months alone, 75 young men had attended call-ins, helping spread the word widely early in the initiative, and creating a sense of momentum and enthusiasm among the partners. The call-ins were held at locations important and familiar to the community, including the South Sacramento Christian Center and the Pannell Meadowview Community Center.

The frequent and regular clergy-led night walks (see *Figure 2*), the high quality of the service initiative overseen by SETA, and the partners’ close coordination with law enforcement agencies signaled the community’s determination to ending violence. So, what happened?

- ◆ **Making a safer neighborhood:** *Figures 3 and 4* include density maps of shootings in Sacramento as a whole and the Mack Road corridor in south Sacramento, in particular, for the years 2009 through 2011. *Figure 3*, a density map of the whole city for 2010, makes clear the Mack Road corridor was the “hottest” of the city’s hot spots in terms of shootings. *Figure 4* compares the density of shootings each year from 2009 - 2011 in the Mack Road corridor. The point of intervention occurs near the end of 2010 and, as illustrated by the density map for 2011, the neighborhood benefitted from a significant drop in shootings.



◆ **The larger context: what the reduction means when compared with the rest of Sacramento:** *Figure 5*

5 compares the percentage decrease in shootings from four perspectives:


◇ A in this figure illustrates the percentage drop in shootings between SSCP's primary focus—the groups in conflict: a 70 percent drop.

◇ B in this figure illustrates the percentage drop in shootings in the Mack Road corridor, the neighborhoods where the partners focused the clergy walks and street outreach efforts: a 58.3 percent drop.

◇ C in this figure illustrates the drop in shootings in District 5 which includes the Mack Road area but is much larger and stretches across most of south Sacramento: a 24.4 percent drop.

◇ D in this figure illustrates the drop in shootings citywide: a 16.7 percent drop.

◇ *The decrease in shootings between the focus groups and in the focus area outpaced the overall decrease in south Sacramento and the city as a whole.* Furthermore, the extent of the decrease, its timing and its geographic focus suggests the collective efforts of the SSCP partners coincided with a significant and sustained decrease in violence among the groups in conflict and in the Mack Road corridor. At the time of this report in early 2012, the focus of the partners in south Sacramento is mostly on maintaining the gains made there.



◆ **Participant Recidivism:** Only five of the first 75 participants (those that participated in call-ins more than a year ago) in this highest-risk population have been rearrested for violent felonies including a firearm. We are encouraged by this but note that it's very early to draw overall conclusions regarding the effect of the intervention on recidivism. There are several reasons for this, including time lags in updating state and local records on re-arrest and re-incarceration and the lack of good baseline comparisons for the city and county of Sacramento. We will provide more information on recidivism (including its relationship to participation in services) as it becomes available.

Conclusion: The in-depth analysis we conducted of violence in south Sacramento at the beginning of this work suggests that group violence accounts for approximately 52 percent of the violence there. Our preliminary analysis of other violent incidents (drug-related violence and domestic violence, for example) suggest that individuals involved in criminally-active groups are responsible for another 25 percent of the area's violence. Therefore, the SSCP's progress thus far represents an effective investment in perhaps the most challenging crime problem in Sacramento.

Acknowledgements: This work received generous support from The California Endowment; Kaiser Permanente, Northern California Region, Community Benefits; The California Wellness Foundation; and the Governor's Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy.

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


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Operation Ceasefire And The Safe Community Partnership

Over the past 15 years, numerous cities across the country have successfully reduced relatively high rates of gang and youth gun violence through a strategy that brings together – and assigns specific roles to – criminal justice agencies, organizations that provide employment training and placement, social service agencies, community and faith leaders, and gang outreach programs. Operation Ceasefire was instituted in Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, and Indianapolis and these cities achieved reductions in gun homicide of 25 to over 60 percent and, here in California, Stockton reduced gun homicide by more than 43 percent between 1998 and 2001. This strategy, based upon extensive research and experience, has evolved from a primary focus on deterring serious gang and youth gun violence, to a comprehensive approach that combines deterrence with workforce training, employment, and other services.

The Operation Ceasefire model is being used in California under the program name Safe Community Partnership (SCP). The SCP is a partnership among the Governor's Office, private funders (including the California Wellness Foundation, the California Endowment, and Kaiser Permanente, Community Benefits, Northern California Region), the Public Health Institute, and six California cities (Modesto, Stockton, Oakland, Salinas, Oxnard and Union City). These partners are working together to implement an evidence-based, data-driven approach designed to reduce serious gang violence in the near term and on a community-wide level. In addition to Oakland and Salinas in the Northern District, East Palo Alto, Richmond and Union City have been added to the Safe Community Partnership/Operation Ceasefire program.

The U.S. Attorney plays an integral role in the program. The U.S. Attorney's office has Assistant U. S. Attorneys assigned to these efforts -- attending Working Group meetings, helping devise strategies and participating with the FBI and ATF in gang "call ins" to deliver the law enforcement message. In addition, the Assistant U.S. Attorneys work closely with the individual District Attorney's offices in deciding which cases would have most impact under federal prosecution.

As part of the comprehensive program, each selected city must implement a strategy based on partnering, planning, and implementation to reduce its relatively high rate of gang and youth gun violence. This involves several steps:

Analyzing of the dynamics of local gun violence: A city will collect and analyze basic data on gun violence, including the geographic location of violent incidents, demographic information on individuals involved in gun violence, and patterns of gang violence. This data will be used by the working group (described below) to design its strategy.

Organizing a working group that will design and implement the local strategy: A city will organize a working group that includes representation from public and private employment training and placement providers, criminal justice agencies (including District Attorney's office, Police Department, Sheriff's Department, and Probation Office, and the U.S. Attorney), community leaders, gang outreach workers, and public and private social service agencies that serve youthful offenders, youth at risk of violence, and gang members. Drawing on the data analysis above, each working group will design and implement a local strategy that includes: (a) directly communicating a violence prevention message to the gang members and youth most likely to commit gun violence, (b) linking these gang members and youth to training and employment opportunities, and (c) coordinating law enforcement efforts.

Communicating directly with the gang members and youth most likely to commit gun violence: A city will communicate directly with selected gang members and young people. This is accomplished primarily at group meetings known as "call ins" or "forums," attended by representatives of the working group and the particular gang members and young people. At these meetings, the working group will set forth a two-part message: (a) gun violence must stop immediately or criminal justice agencies will intervene quickly and forcefully against those responsible; and (b) the group is there to support the gang members and youth with intensive services and employment.

Connecting gang members and young people to employment opportunities: Each city will



strengthen its capacity to place the gang members and young people identified as most likely to commit gun violence in quality employment opportunities. This includes providing social services, "soft skills" training, ongoing support (such as mentoring and mutual support programs), and job training and placements.

Building a strategic law enforcement partnership: An essential component of this approach calls for criminal justice agencies to focus their enforcement efforts on the relatively small group of gang members and young people who "drive" gun violence as determined by the problem analysis described above – particularly to the extent that these gang members and young people disregard the message to cease gun violence.

For more information on the success of Operation Ceasefire please see the recent article [Ceasefire Spreading like Wildfire in California](#).

Please visit the [California Governor's Office website](#) for more information on Operation Ceasefire and the Safe Community Partnership.

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
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Promising Practices

Ceasefire Spreading Like Wildfire in California

By Ryan Sugden, Guest Contributor

A program known for its local roots is taking flight across California, showing promise for successful state-level promotion of local anti-gang violence strategies. Programs modeled after Operation Ceasefire, of Boston fame for its success combating gang and gun violence, are being implemented across California under the direction of Paul Seave, Director of the Governor's Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy. Seave's office used rounds of state anti-gang grants to encourage adoption of the Ceasefire model, renaming it the Safe Community Partnership, and obtained \$1 million in private funding for intensive implementation support. Ten projects are currently in planning or implementation stages with one reporting a 50 percent reduction in shootings in the first half of this year.

Seave first encountered Ceasefire in 1997 when, as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of California, he was part of a team that implemented the model in Stockton, CA. In a short time, gun homicides had dropped in the city an astounding 43 percent. Once appointed to lead California's anti-gang efforts, Seave pushed to spread the model statewide. Under the model, gang-involved youth posing the highest risk of violence are called in to meet law enforcement officials, community members, and service providers who present them with a life-altering choice: put down their weapons and accept social service and employment assistance or face the full weight of the law. The model requires tight partnerships among government, law enforcement and non-profit agencies spanning a wide spectrum – from education, employment and counseling services to the FBI.

In two rounds of funding, 10 communities received grants with awards ranging from \$192,000 to \$400,000. Currently, Bakersfield, East Palo Alto, Fresno, Modesto, Oakland, Oxnard, Sacramento, Salinas, Stockton and Union City are in various stages of implementation. The applicants were not required to adopt the Ceasefire model; rather, using the model was just one way to gain points for the community's grant application. This approach avoided having communities piece together coalitions solely for the purpose of receiving a grant.

State Promotion, Local Results

California has successfully promoted – at the state level – the adoption of a program that is known for its grassroots origin. Seave strikes an encouraging

tone when asked whether the statewide spread of the model is reproducible. His endorsement is not without one important qualification, however. Seave forecasted that "if you do it – and you do it right – you will see tremendous results. But it's hard work."

Tremendous results indeed. In Salinas, gang-related shootings have been cut in half and homicides have dropped 80%. From January to June this year, there were only 41 shootings – compared to 80 in the first six months of 2009 – a pace that will shatter the city's recent yearly average of attempted murders with a gun (139). Oxnard, which put the Ceasefire model into play late last year, has seen the lowest six-week period of serious crime in recent memory, David Keith, public spokesman for the Oxnard Police Department, said in a recent news article. Other communities are in various early stages of implementation.

Implementation and Technical Assistance as Keys to Success

Credit for the hard work of fighting gangs and reducing gun violence, Seave hastened to add, is properly attributed to local officials. Yet, the involvement of state and professional consultants has been an invaluable – indeed a critical – element of the programs' success. The difference that separates California's approach to other attempts to promote anti-gang and gun models, Seave noted, is intensive and well-funded training and technical assistance.

"The art – or emerging science – of implementation is the hard part" of nearly all evidence-based programs, Seave acknowledged. Grantors are frequently forced to follow one of two paths: awarding grants with the hope that recipients follow the model, or actively participating in implementation by giving local officials the tools to maintain 'fidelity to the model.' California has energetically taken the latter approach. "As opposed to other grants where support for implementation is minimal, in the Safe Community Partnership, it is intensive," Seave noted. "That's the new part."

Three private foundations donated over \$1 million for technical assistance and training. Under the leadership of Stewart Wakeling, an expert in criminal justice research and policy with extensive experience in the Ceasefire strategy, consultants with expertise in the strategy assist local officials in fine-tuning their programs for maximum effectiveness. In Salinas, Wakeling's analysis found that underage shooters have minimal criminal histories. This breaks sharply from other communities where gun offenders typically run up lengthy rap sheets before committing gun crimes. Information such as this proves pivotal in targeting likely offenders.

California's resources for technical assistance were the "fortuitous" result of charitable organizations' awareness of the crime problem and appreciation for violence prevention, Seave said. He acknowledged that not every state will have \$1 million in private donations for technical assistance. However, Seave urged states to reserve as much funding as possible, whether state, federal or private, for technical assistance. The difference is a genuine implementation of the model, which, history has shown, offers a significant and quantifiable return on investment. And, as California is beginning to

demonstrate, such results may be possible in communities statewide.

For more information on California's Safe Community Partnership strategy, click [here](#).

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EVIDENCE SUPPORTING CEASEFIRE-STYLE INTERVENTIONS

The Campbell Collaboration’s Systematic Review of the effects of Ceasefire-style interventions confirmed the following demonstrated results:

<u>STUDY and LOCATION</u>	<u>MAIN OUTCOME</u>
Boston Operation Ceasefire	63% reduction in youth homicide
Indianapolis IVRP	34% reduction in total homicide
Stockton Operation Peacekeeper	42% reduction in gun homicide
Lowell Project Safe Neighborhoods	44% reduction in gun assaults
Cincinnati CIRV	35% reduction in group member-involved homicide
Newark Ceasefire	No significant reduction in gunshot wound incidents
Los Angeles Operation Ceasefire	Significant short-term reduction in violent gun crime
<i>Chicago PSN</i>	<i>37% reduction in homicide, 30% reduction in recidivism rate</i>
Rockford Drug Market Intervention	22% reduction in non-violent offenses
Hawaii HOPE	26% reduction in recidivism rate among probationers

NOTE:

- **Bold font** indicates interventions that followed the “Operation Ceasefire” model and focus on serious violence associated with street groups and gangs. Communication to groups occurs mostly through young men at highest risk of violence on probation or parole.
- *Italic font* indicates interventions that followed the “Chicago PSN” model focusing on high risk individuals returning to the community from incarceration.
- Regular font indicates interventions that followed the “Drug Market Intervention” or DMI model in which the focus is on dangerous drug markets, and the focus of communication is with all retail dealers in a given market.

All three versions depend on direct communication.

THE RESULTS ABOVE DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERVENTION ACROSS DIFFERENT CITIES, GROUPS, DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.