



City of Sacramento
2009 Sacramento Charter Review Committee

**Correspondence Received for Meeting of
Thursday, September 3, 2009**

1. Chester A Newland (Charter Review Issues)
2. Mike-Opinion
3. Staff-Town Hall Meeting Series Flyer DRAFT
4. A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California by JT Long
5. Alan LaFaso email - Term Limits
6. Mayor-Council-CAO Government Summary-National Civic League

Sacramento Charter Review Issues
Chester A. (Chet) Newland
3 September 2009

Sacramento should not allow itself to be pushed into making rushed, unwise City Charter changes in response to interests who have qualified the Initiative that is now scheduled to appear on the June 2010 Ballot. Warranting consideration are observations of informed Sacramento officials and other civic leaders and residents who think that a reasonable option may be to identify defects of the proposed Charter Initiative and, for clarity, recommend no changes in 2010. Thoughtful community consideration might then be given, possibly for submission in 2012, to alterations of outdated parts of the Charter and to such enhanced responsibility provisions as a City Ethics Commission, a mayoral earned-income provision, and an Instant Run-Off Voting system to limit political-campaign costs.

Even so, the CRC is especially required to focus now on the central issue that led the City Council to create this Committee: a radical proposal to change Sacramento's council/mayor/professional management form of government to an executive-mayor political structure. Given that basic issue and the subsequently shortened deadline for CRC recommendations to the Council, some crucial points warrant prompt consideration.

First, it needs to be understood that both a politically empowered mayoral structure and an executive-mayor form of government, even when under a professionally crafted charter, are powerful prescriptions for a *weak and often-divided city council* and *severely narrowed civic leadership*. Under either of these charter structures, Sacramento's neighborhoods, valued community diversity, and varied cultural institutions and practices would lose influence as informed support for them by council members would be vastly diminished. Opportunities to encourage widely differing civic participation of residents and to recognize their individual and organizational accomplishments would be reduced, along with *vital City Council leadership* on behalf of all constructive Sacramento interests. Power would shift from a variable-sum framework designed to multiply constructive community values toward a system of personalized political-power aggrandizement.

Second, it would be unwise to take away the independence of Charter Officials by having them employed as mayoral appointees with mere majority Council consent. One must not be naive about the roles of self-serving interests in appointments made by mayors and other singularly empowered political officials. As both Presidents Truman and Johnson lamented, they experienced relentless pressures in making appointments. Special interests and political patrons sought control of selections and officials' loyalties in office. That Political Spoils Culture, which has vastly expanded nationwide since the late 1960s, is no different at the local level of American government. It prevails among charter-empowered mayors. Under Sacramento's existing Charter, the present City Attorney, Treasurer, and City Clerk are respected as

exemplary, and that is crucial to their vital roles. Imagine if the City Attorney were a mayoral appointee, subject to removal for convenience, and were required to analyze the proposed Charter Initiative and other challenging issues. Imagine how financial institutions would view the City's condition if the Treasurer were a mayoral appointee rather than a professional expert with broad Council and community respect. Imagine Sacramento departing from the almost universal culture of community-embedded City and County Clerks as expert public servants of all residents, performing a treasured *facilitator role* of American local governments.

Similarly, the City's manager should serve as a professional with broad authority of the Council, not as a mayoral *appointee at convenience of a faction*, subject to narrow interests of a charter-empowered mayor. As has been observed, *a narrow few interests*, working with no broad community inputs, created the Charter proposal now forcing a choice by voters next June. Similarly obscure interests may influence selection and retention of Sacramento's four charter officials if they become appointees of a mayor.

The irony is that neither separation of city council and mayoral powers nor distinctive mayoral appointment and removal control are in the interests of a mayor with aspirations for broadly recognized strong leadership via civic integrity and noteworthy accomplishments. A mayor with command-and-control powers becomes subject to self-serving interests and a political culture of unilateral power and entitlement, while *council members are downgraded to subordinate roles*. Sacramento will be wise not to subject present and future mayors, council members, managers, and city residents to such harsh political realities.

Talented mayors are able to perform best and escape falling into disgrace when they seek to provide effective leadership while, *in full partnership with the City Council*, they rely on knowledgeable professional experts to guide them and their governments to avoid troubling behaviors and errors while advancing constructive initiatives to solve problems and create fresh opportunities. Within that framework, an effective mayor provides informed and vigorous leadership for sustained accomplishment and to move a community forward. Sacramento's present Charter facilitates such responsible leadership.

It is useful for mayors, council members, and others to understand that *Leadership is not what an official does because he/she has power; LEADERSHIP IS THE INFLUENCE THAT ONE EXERTS WHEN PEOPLE DO NOT HAVE TO DO WHAT ONE COMMANDS*. It follows that such leadership, not personalized command-and-control structure, makes the difference for Star Performance in cities.

CharterReview - Public Contact

From: <yogoombah@yahoo.com>
To: <CharterReview@cityofsacramento.org>
Date: 9/3/2009 12:14 PM
Subject: Public Contact

Public Contact	
Date	September 3, 2009
Contact Name	Mike
Phone Number	
Constituent E-mail	yogoombah@yahoo.com
Message	<p>The voters need to be reminded that if you like the mayor, you want a strong mayor. However, you may not like the next mayor but he or she will have the same powers. So be careful what you wish for because there may be unintended consequences. A mayor's strength should reside in his vision and his ability to communicate that vision. It should not reside in his legal power to force his will when he can not get a majority to vote for his vision. The people who are pushing this change now are not thinking about the long term. They want maximum influence now. They can take advantage of that and leave the table with their pockets full. We who remain, however, will be stuck with the consequences including many short-sighted land use decisions that favor a few with no concern for the future. (The up-date of the county general plan is a good example of this.) It is too often true that if you spend enough money on TV ads that distort the facts, you can pass almost any thing. Therefore, your commission, unfortunately, will have to come up with a "strong mayor" alternative to prevent the proponents of the "super strong mayor" from making a straw man out of the status quo. Even though it ain't broke, you may have to "fix it." If you do not present a reasonable alternative, the too strong mayor function will come to pass and we will later regret it.</p>
This message originated at www.cityofsacramento.org/charter/contact.html	

Invites you to a Town Hall Meeting Series on Charter Reform

The Sacramento Charter Review Committee has developed a Draft Report recommending changes to the Sacramento City Charter. Attend a meeting and share your thoughts with the Committee!

SCHEDULE

All meetings are scheduled to start at 6:30 p.m.
(unless otherwise noted)

SEPTEMBER

Wednesday, September 23rd

American Lakes Elementary – 2800 Stonecreek Dr.

Thursday, September 24th

Ben Ali Shrine Temple – 3262 Marysville Blvd.

Monday, September 28th

Inderkum High School – 2500 Market Dr.

Wednesday, September 30th

Elks Lodge – 6446 Riverside Blvd.

OCTOBER

Thursday, October 1st

Christian Brothers High School – 4315 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.

Monday, October 5th

Thomas Jefferson Elementary – 2635 Chestnut Hill Dr.

Wednesday, October 7th

Sam Brannan Middle School – 5301 Elmer Way

Thursday, October 8th

Caleb Greenwood – 5457 Carlson Dr.

Wednesday, October 14th


Sam Pannell Community Center – 2450 Meadowview Rd.

Thursday, October 15th

Sierra II – 2791 24th Street

Public Invited!

Comment on the Committee's Draft
Report at one of our Town Hall Meetings.



CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE MEMBERS

William Edgar, Chair
JoAnn Fuller, Vice-Chair
Cecily Hastings
Grantland Johnson
Alan LoFaso
Robert Murphy
Chester Newland
Chris Tapio
John Taylor
Tina Thomas
William Jay Wisham



search...

SEARCH

News Updates

email address _____

REGISTER

Welcome

[PublicCEO Exclusive](#)
[Blogs](#)
[Editorials](#)
[Profiles](#)
[PublicCEO Job Board](#)
[Staff Reports](#)
[It Could Be Worse ...](#)
[Professional Education](#)

Topics

[Local Governments](#)
[Public Safety](#)
[Energy](#)
[Policy Issues](#)
[Environmental Issues](#)
[Technologies](#)
[Water](#)



A SHORT HISTORY OF THE STRONG MAYOR IN CALIFORNIA

Written by [JT Long](#)

September 3, 2009

As *Sacramentans* consider whether to modify the city charter on June 8, 2010 to give **Mayor Kevin Johnson** and all successive mayors in the River City the power of a CEO to hire and fire and propose a budget, PublicCEO thought a history of local level leadership would help focus the discussion.

The Original Move Away From a Strong Mayor

An executive system of local government similar to the way the federal and state government operate was the norm in the early formation of the country.

However, by the time California city and county charters were being written in the Progressive era of the early 1900s, corrupt mayor boss scandals led many to create a council form of government that spread power among elected officials who hired a professional city manager to run day-to-day government operations. This was the same movement that added recalls and referendums as options in the state constitution.

"That [moving away from a mayor-council form of governing] was a mistake," said Adrian S. Kwiatkowski, president of the San Diego-based Strong Mayor-Council Institute, a consulting firm. "Ethics rules would have been a better fix."

The organizational chart of a council-manager run city more closely resembles a corporation with a board and a hired CEO than the institutions established by the founding fathers, said Robert Huckfeldt, political science professor at UC Davis.

"The reformers wanted to take politics out of government, but the irony is that the framers of the constitution believed that everyone acts in their own interests they

established a system of checks and balances," Huckfeldt explained.

"It is a fallacy that the city manager is not a political position. They may be professionally trained," Kwiatkowski said. "But they still serve at the whim of a political body."

Kwiatkowski called the title of mayor a misnomer when his only power beyond that of any other city council member is to chair the meeting. "The public usually thinks the mayor has executive authority and don't know who the city manager is or what they do," Kwiatkowski said.

Pros and Cons

Huckfeldt said the benefit of the mayor-council system for citizens is accountability.

"When there are so many chefs in the kitchen, who do you blame when the soup comes out wrong?"

In the strong-mayor form of government, the top elected official can't point the finger at his colleagues on the council.

Anne Rudin, a former Sacramento Mayor, said in an interview that the idea of a strong mayor system has come up several times and was always turned down. She didn't feel the additional power was needed. "I never felt constrained; I worked closely with city manager to influence policy."

Rudin called the strong mayor idea "dangerous" because it mixes politics and administration. "The mayor's race can be a popularity contest that doesn't ensure the winner has public policy skills that a professional manager would learn by coming up through the ranks."

Dwight Stenbakken, League of California Cities deputy executive director, said the mayor-council-manager dynamic already varies from city to city.

"Many city managers have learned to be flexible, giving up more power than in the past," Stenbakken said.

Stenbakken acknowledged some elected officials want to spend more time and have more direct control without a city manager in the middle. He also hears the argument that a city manager brings more professional operation with more efficient delivery of services.

"I don't know if one is better than the other," Stenbakken said. "Ultimately, it is the community's choice. As long as the voters know, the streets won't be paved with gold the next morning, but the mayor may be more responsive to their call about a pothole."

Trend Lines

Some states preempt the power of cities to determine their organizational structure. Some even provide for old-fashioned town hall democracy-types of decision-making. Since California gives local government flexibility, a wide range of systems operate in city halls up and down the state.

So far, five cities have made the switch to mayor-council governance.

Many times the change is precipitated by a financial crisis and ushered in by a dynamic personality who can help sell the idea, observed the League's Stenbakken.

"There is no trend, but if there is a pattern, communities tend to consider when they reach a certain size – ½ million to a million population range," Stenbakken said.

Fresno, population 500,000, voted in the strong mayor form of government in 1993 and the change took effect in 1997. The change was predicated by a Little Hoover Commission recommendation to review government structure. The citywide elected mayor can hire and fire the city manager and has veto power over council actions.

Los Angeles' 9.8 million people are governed by a charter passed in 1999 that created a system of neighborhood advisory councils, gave local communities some control of planning and zoning and gave the mayor the power to fire department general managers. The moderate strong mayor measure was placed on the ballot after some areas of the city threatened to secede and start their own municipalities.

In 2004, Oakland voters made permanent the temporary strong-mayor system passed in 1998. The provision in the city of 420,000 people required that the city attorney be elected; an ethics committee set salaries and limited the mayor's service to two terms.

San Diego adopted a five-year strong-mayor trial period in 2006 after a corruption scandal. A vote in the city of 3 million to make the measure permanent could go on the ballot in 2010.

San Francisco's 808,000 people make up the population of the city and the county. The mayor is also the county executive and the board of supervisors is in charge of passing the budget with his approval.

Because of increased political activity and diverse populations, Kwiatkowski predicts more cities with populations of more than 100,000 will switch from council-manager operations to some type of mayor-council system.

Measure of Strength

Not all strong mayor systems are alike.

"The devil is in the details," said UC Davis' Huckfeldt.

In some cities, the city council goes full-time along with the mayor. Some strong mayors, like Oakland and Fresno, keep a city administrator in place.

Of the strong mayor systems in the state, the measure going to Sacramento voters would be one of the strongest. The mayor would have the power to hire and fire the city manager, treasurer, clerk, attorney and subordinate staff. In many cities these positions are elected posts.

City Council would have 30 days to reject an appointment, but couldn't stop the removal of an employee. The proposed ballot measure would give the mayor veto power and the ability to introduce a budget that would automatically become law unless the city council overrides.

Controversial details include the creation of a ninth city district to keep the number of council members odd and lack of an ethics commission or term limits.

Mayor Kevin Johnson, who included his plans for a strong mayor form of governance in his campaign platform, announced his intention to put the measure on the ballot within a month of taking office to fulfill what he considered his mandate "action, results and accountability."

In an interview on Capitol Public Radio's Insight, he said the checks and balances in his plan rest with the voters. "If a mayor is the chief executive officer, then the voters is able to hold that mayor accountable for the results."

JT Long can be reached at jtlongandco@gmail.com

TRACKBACK(0)

 [TrackBack URI for this entry](#)

COMMENTS (2)

 [Subscribe to this comment's feed](#)

...
written by John E McCue, September 3, 2009

Perhaps, City Managers and City Councils can start making a change in the United States that can prevent or at least slow down the deterioration of the entire country. The failure of management must be the reason the infrastructure of the United States is deteriorating. And that must be attributed to their fear of the population and those that contribute to them.

As knowledgeable people have pointed out, the failure of great cultures happened after the infrastructure that made them great deteriorated. I want to say the start on our way to "Enron" and collapsing bridges and shouting attendees at "Town Hall" meetings began with the attitudes of the baby boomers just as the deterioration of the Roman Empire began with the attitude of the Roman citizens.

Trying to think who could start the process to save our country for our grand children and great grand children I could only come up with a grass roots group: City Managers and City Councils. It will take courage.

...
written by Nathaniel Bates, September 3, 2009

I like Mayor Kevin Johnson because he bring fresh ideas of new leadership. However as an elected official for some thirty years, Kevin does not understand government and its make up. Regardless of how well intended a politician in which Kevin is, running a multi-million operation requires a professional person with education and training. People often talk about running government like a private business but they forget that government is more complicated and regulated in what you can and cannot do with personnel, expenditures of tax payers monies, etc. Simply being a strong mayor will not afford one the opportunity to fire and hire staff at their will. Regardless how incompetent a staff member may be, unless they are an at will employee, it will take an act of congress to replace them. Sacramento voters should think hard and clear before adopting a full time mayor position. Kevin may be a good choice today but what about the future mayors to follow who win election on popularity vote without experience.

WRITE COMMENT

Name

Email

Website

Comment



smaller | bigger

I have read and agree to the [Terms of Usage](#).

Add Comment

[Home](#) [About PublicCEO](#) [Contact Us](#) [Advertise](#)

© 2009 PublicCEO.com - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Dawn Bullwinkel - Fwd: Re: Correspondence from Cecily Hastings

From: Shirley Concolino
To: Bullwinkel, Dawn
Date: Thursday, September 03, 2009 4:11 PM
Subject: Fwd: Re: Correspondence from Cecily Hastings

more

>>> On 9/3/2009 at 4:09 PM, in message <8CBFB02CA8E3BCA-1544-1754D@webmail-m084.sysops.aol.com>, <alofaso@aol.com> wrote:
 Mark, et al. -

Not to pile on, but I am remiss in not previously forwarding the attached chart from NCSL showing the length of states' term limits and whether they are lifetime or consecutive. It seemed appropriate from last meeting's discussion. I looked for similar tables on cities' limits, and I couldn't find any on the web. While cities' information would be better, I thought this might be useful for the ongoing term limits discussion.

<http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/LegislatorsLegislativeStaffData/ChartofTermLimitsStates/tabid/14844/Default.aspx>

If you're properly record for the public record, that would be great. I'll also bring copies for the meeting, given the late date, etc.

Thanks. Alan.

The Term Limited States

Updated June 2009

The following table represents the 15 states that currently have term limits for legislators. They are ordered by the year of term limits' impact--the first year in which incumbents who were serving when the term limits measure was passed are no longer eligible to run for re-election. At the bottom of the page is a [table of states](#) that had term limits in the past but no longer do (due to legislative or court action).

State	Year Enacted	House		Senate		% Voted Yes
		Limit	Year of Impact	Limit	Year of Impact	
MAINE	1993	8	1996	8	1996	67.6
CALIFORNIA	1990	6	1996	8	1998	52.2
COLORADO	1990	8	1998	8	1998	71
ARKANSAS	1992	6	1998	8	2000	59.9
MICHIGAN	1992	6	1998	8	2002	58.8
FLORIDA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	76.8
OHIO	1992	8	2000	8	2000	68.4
SOUTH DAKOTA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	63.5
MONTANA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	67
ARIZONA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	74.2
* MISSOURI	1992	8	2002	8	2002	75
OKLAHOMA	1990	12	2004	12	2004	67.3
NEBRASKA	2000	n/a	n/a	8	2006	56
LOUISIANA	1995	12	2007	12	2007	76
**NEVADA	1996	12	2010	12	2010	70.4

* Because of special elections, term limits were effective in 2000 for eight current members of the House and one Senator in 1998.

**The Nevada Legislative Council and Attorney General have ruled that Nevada's term limits cannot be applied to those legislators elected in the same year term limits were passed (1996). They first apply to persons elected in 1998.

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

Consecutive vs. Lifetime Limits

Term limits may be divided into two broad categories: consecutive and lifetime. With consecutive term limits, a legislator is limited to serving a particular number of years in a chamber. Upon hitting the limit in one chamber, a legislator may run for election to the other chamber or leave the legislature. After a set period of time (usually two years), the clock resets on the limit, and the legislator may run for election to his/her original seat and serve up to the limit again.

With lifetime limits, on the other hand, once a legislator has served up to the limit, she/he may never again run for election to that office. Lifetime limits are much more restrictive than consecutive limits.

Limit in Years	Consecutive	Lifetime Ban
6 house / 8 senate		AR, CA, MI
8 total	NE	
8 house / 8 senate	AZ, CO, FL, ME, MT, OH, SD	MO
12 total		OK
12 house / 12 senate	LA	NV

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

Term Limits Repeals

In six states, term limits have been repealed by the legislature or by court action.

State	Year Repealed	Year Enacted	Who Repealed?
IDAHO	2002	1994	Legislature
MASSACHUSETTS	1997	1994	State Supreme Court
OREGON	2002	1992	State Supreme Court
UTAH	2003	1994	Legislature
WASHINGTON	1998	1992	State Supreme Court
WYOMING	2004	1992	State Supreme Court

-----Original Message-----

From: Mark Prestwich <MPrestwich@cityofsacramento.org>

To: alofaso@aol.com; gjohnson@chochousing.org; JFuller@CommonCause.org; bille@eanda.org; jayandval@earthlink.net; chris.tapio@gmail.com; tinathomascharter@gmail.com; Cecily@insidepublications.com; remurphy@kmtg.com; tthomas@rtmmlaw.com; jtaylor@taylor-wiley.com; newland@usc.edu

Cc: Patti Bisharat <PBisharat@cityofsacramento.org>; Shirley Concolino <SConcolino@cityofsacramento.org>

Sent: Thu, Sep 3, 2009 1:24 pm

Subject: Correspondence from Cecily Hastings

Dear Charter Review Committee Members,

Below is a link to the article "A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California", published on www.PUBLICCEO.com. Cecily Hastings requested the link to the article be shared with Charter Review Committee members.

http://www.publicceo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=536:a-short-history-of-the-strong-mayor-in-california&catid=151:local-gove

Mark Prestwich
Special Projects Manager
City of Sacramento
Office of the City Manager
915 I Street, 5th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
T: (916) 808-5380
F: (916) 808-7618
mprestwich@cityofsacramento.org



GO

Legislatures & Elections » Legislators & Legislative Staff Data » Chart of Term Limits States

Go 14844

The Term Limited States

Updated June 2009

The following table represents the 15 states that currently have term limits for legislators. They are ordered by the year of term limits' impact--the first year in which incumbents who were serving when the term limits measure was passed are no longer eligible to run for re-election. At the bottom of the page is a table of states that had term limits in the past but no longer do (due to legislative or court action).

State	Year Enacted	House		Senate		% Voted Yes
		Limit	Year of Impact	Limit	Year of Impact	
MAINE	1993	8	1996	8	1996	67.6
CALIFORNIA	1990	6	1996	8	1998	52.2
COLORADO	1990	8	1998	8	1998	71
ARKANSAS	1992	6	1998	8	2000	59.9
MICHIGAN	1992	6	1998	8	2002	58.8
FLORIDA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	76.8
OHIO	1992	8	2000	8	2000	68.4
SOUTH DAKOTA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	63.5
MONTANA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	67
ARIZONA	1992	8	2000	8	2000	74.2
* MISSOURI	1992	8	2002	8	2002	75
OKLAHOMA	1990	12	2004	12	2004	67.3
NEBRASKA	2000	n/a	n/a	8	2006	56
LOUISIANA	1995	12	2007	12	2007	76
**NEVADA	1996	12	2010	12	2010	70.4

* Because of special elections, term limits were effective in 2000 for eight current members of the House and one Senator in 1998.

**The Nevada Legislative Council and Attorney General have ruled that Nevada's term limits cannot be applied to those legislators elected in the same year term limits were passed (1996). They first apply to persons elected in 1998.

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

Consecutive vs. Lifetime Limits

Term limits may be divided into two broad categories: consecutive and lifetime. With consecutive term limits, a legislator is limited to serving a particular number of years in a chamber. Upon hitting the limit in one chamber, a legislator may run for election to the other chamber or leave the legislature. After a set period of time (usually two years), the clock resets on the limit, and the legislator may run for election to his/her original seat and serve up to the limit again.

With lifetime limits, on the other hand, once a legislator has served up to the limit, she/he may never again run for election to that office. Lifetime limits are much more restrictive than consecutive limits.

Limit in Years	Consecutive	Lifetime Ban
6 house / 8 senate		AR, CA, MI
8 total	NE	
8 house / 8 senate	AZ, CO, FL, ME, MT, OH, SD	MO
12 total		OK
12 house / 12 senate	LA	NV

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

Term Limits Repeals

In six states, term limits have been repealed by the legislature or by court action.

State	Year Repealed	Year Enacted	Who Repealed?
IDAHO	2002	1994	Legislature
MASSACHUSETTS	1997	1994	State Supreme Court
OREGON	2002	1992	State Supreme Court
UTAH	2003	1994	Legislature
WASHINGTON	1998	1992	State Supreme Court
WYOMING	2004	1992	State Supreme Court

For More Information

Jennie Drage Bowser tracks term limits, and may be reached at 303-364-7700 or elections-info@ncsl.org.

Denver Office
Tel: 303-364-7700 | Fax: 303-364-7600 | 7700 East First Place | Denver, CO 80230

Washington Office
Tel: 202-624-5460 | Fax: 202-737-1069 | 444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 515 | Washington, D.C. 20001

©2009 National Conference of State Legislatures. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use | Privacy Policy

Mayor-Council-CAO government
Summary
from Model City Charter, 8th Edition by the National Civic League

- Based on separated and shared powers
- Found in most mayor-council cities
- Is not a “strong” mayor structure
- Mayor is CEO who oversees work of the CAO
- CAO is nominated by the mayor and approved by the council
- Mayor may remove CAO
- CAO should have same professional qualifications as the city manager
- CAO formulates the budget for the mayor, and the mayor presents the budget to the council with his or her own recommendations added to those of the CAO
- The CAO recommends major personnel appointments to the mayor who presents them to the council for approval
- The mayor may remove department heads
- CAO serves as a bridge to span the separation of powers between the mayor and the council
- The CAO provides professional advice and detached assessment regarding key decisions to both the mayor and the council
- Mayor has an assigned role in the legislative process and must make a decision on each ordinance to sign it, veto it, or let it become law without signature (council may override the veto by a two-thirds vote of its members)
- Shared power provisions may serve to knit the separate branches more closely together